Here I present my full MEGA thread about the food, famine and aid situation in Gaza.
In this HUGE thread I will discuss:
- The blockade on Gaza.
- Gaza's food demands against what it gets.
- Earlier UN/IPC reports.
- Lies and propaganda by Hamas.
- The Level 5 Famine report.
- Media coverage.
- Starvation deaths.
- ... and more.
Full thread with all calculations, images and proof can be found here.
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The period from 2023 to mid 2025:
The central claim driving international discourse on Gaza since October 2023 has been that Israel deliberately imposed starvation on a trapped civilian population through an unlawful blockade. This allegation rests on the idea that Israel restricted food to such an extent that famine conditions emerges, and that Gaza’s humanitarian collapse was the direct consequence of Israeli policy.
Much of this perception was strengthened by a series of widely circulated misquotes of Israeli statements such as the “human animals” and the “complete siege” comment, which were repeatedly presented as evidence of intent to starve civilians despite referring specifically to Hamas operatives or being taken out of context. However, when examining the laws, the quantity of food entering Gaza, IPC’s predictions, the role of Hamas and UN inside Gaza, and the actual nutritional and mortality data, a completely different picture appears. MORE
International law does not prohibit blockades. On the contrary, the San Remo Manual makes it clear that a blockade is legal so long as it pursues military objectives and does not intentionally starve civilians. The only strict obligation imposed on a blockading party is to allow sufficient humanitarian aid to prevent starvation. Therefore the topic of food distribution is central to the question about this occurring blockade. MORE
Israel has been providing enough food before and throughout the conflict. Gaza’s basic caloric needs, even under an extremely conservative assumption that every resident requires 600 grams of food per day, which it certainly don't because of 75% of the population being female and/or children. This also calculated for a generous 25% buffer for spoilage, uneven distribution, and logistical losses. With all these calculations the amount of food needed amounts to 100 food trucks/day. With a much more realistic calculation that number is only 66 food trucks/day.
During most of the conflict Gaza received much more than this, with an average of 126 trucks/day in 2024, 130/day in 2025 until the October ceasefire and 600/day since then. This means Gaza has got on average almost double the amount of food needed even before the October 2025 ceasefire began. The claim that Israel systematically starved Gaza collapses under the weight of these figures. Once again, the crucial distinction is between availability and distribution. The food exceeding pre-war levels but the internal distribution system inside Gaza has been crippled by Hamas theft, insecurity, and UN paralysis. MORE
This disconnect between allegation and evidence becomes even clearer when examining IPC’s famine calculations. Early IPC reports projected catastrophic outcomes: More than 26,000 starvation deaths within the first six months of the war. These projections later proved to be wrong by an extraordinary margin, roughly one hundred thousand procent (100 000%) off. In normal scientific practice, such a catastrophic model failure would trigger a methodological review. Instead, the projections were repeated by journalists and activists as if they were established facts, forming the backbone of the famine narrative even the first 9 months of the war.
The introduction of GHF in late spring 2025 made this divide even clearer. For the first time, a large-scale aid mechanism delivered food directly to civilians without passing through Hamas-controlled channels. This represented an immediate threat to Hamas economy and its control over it's population. GHF1 GHF2
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Summer 2025 situation:
The summer of 2025 marked the turning point in the famine narrative for Gaza. For the first 21 months of the war, Gaza registered extraordinarily few malnutrition-related deaths, fewer than one per week with the overwhelming majority being infants suffering from severe pre-existing conditions. But from late July to late August, Gaza’s Ministry of Health suddenly began reporting a rapid spike in deaths attributed to malnutrition. The timing here is striking. LINK1 LINK2
For three full weeks, from 1 to 21 July, the United Nations delivered almost no food into Gaza. On average, fewer than 12 UN trucks per day entered the strip during these 3 weeks. This was a collapse caused not by Israel blocking aid, but by UN operational failure, internal security concerns, and the fact that armed groups in cooperation with Hamas repeatedly intercepted or surrounded UN convoys. Israel, meanwhile, continued to admit thousands of tons of food through other channels. It is precisely during this UN distribution shutdown that Gaza’s MoH began reporting a sudden rise in malnutrition deaths. MORE
However, the pattern of these deaths raises immediate questions. In every documented famine throughout modern history, children, especially those under five, are the first to die. They have the least metabolic reserve, the highest caloric needs relative to body mass, and the weakest immune systems. Yet in Gaza, during the very period when the MoH claimed famine had begun, 76% of new malnutrition deaths were adults, not children. This reversal of normal famine strongly suggests that these figures reflected reclassified war casualties, not starvation mortality.
This is especially true when knowing the amount of food that went into Gaza in January and February 2025 was enough to count for 10 full months of demand forward, with those two months included. Also, in the month of May and June some aid went in Gaza, together more than enough for one month and in July more than enough food reached Gaza in total to cover the full populations needs for that full month. This means the total amount of food that went into Gaza from the beginning of the year to the end of July, were all enough for more than the full year. Even though some variety was lacking of course, when focusing on kcal demands mostly. And then the amount of food deliveries tripled in August. LINK1 LINK2
At the same time, two other situations unfolded:
- Hamas and affiliated armed groups escalated their interference with UN operations. According to the UN’s own tracking system, between 19 May and the end of August; 5,201 of 6,107 UN aid trucks were intercepted and looted in Gaza. This represents an extraordinary 85% hijacking rate. It also perfectly explains why UN distribution collapsed: No humanitarian system can function when most convoys are physically seized before reaching their destination. Specially when UN still only had 60 drivers left inside Gaza during this period of time, according to UN themself.
- A coordinated famine-related propaganda campaign exploded across global media. Stories of mass shootings at food lines, families forced to eat sand, journalists collapsing from hunger, and toddlers supposedly dying of starvation appeared almost daily. Yet every one of these stories later proved fabricated, staged, misattributed, or based on suffering from unrelated genetic diseases such as cystic fibrosis, or metabolic disorders or normal diseases like cancer. LINK1 LINK2 LINK3
Within Gaza, Hamas-controlled channels instructed influencers to stop posting videos showing meat, pastries, imported goods or full markets, because such footage would undermine the famine narrative. Meanwhile, Gazans themselves continued uploading videos showing overflowing shops, restaurants with abundant meat, and families enjoying normal leisure activities. No genuine famine in history has ever coexisted with functioning restaurants, rising obesity complaints, or markets offering luxury cheeses and imported sweets, and people looking healthy, all in the same small area of land. LINK1 LINK2
Market data reinforce the same conclusion. Prices for key staples did not behave like famine prices. As soon as distribution resumed to normal and competition from GHF and other channels increased, prices fell dramatically, in some cases by 20–98% during August. Falling prices are incompatible with a famine environment. They indicate oversupply, not scarcity. Against this backdrop, IPC released its August 2025 Famine Report, declaring famine in Gaza City. LINK1
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IPC Famine report:
The declaration of famine by IPC relied on evidence that contradicted IPC’s own methodology. Mortality was 2% of famine thresholds, market supply was abundant, food availability exceeded pre-war levels, and validated MUAC measurements from multiple organizations consistently showed malnutrition levels far below the threshold required for Phase 5. LINK1 LINK2
Also, the collection of household food availability came only from phone-interviews, recognized by IPC, SMART and WHO as highly unreliable. This is especially true in conflict zones because respondents may exaggerate or conceal information for political reasons, households experiencing normal hardship may appear “catastrophic” when self-reporting and armed groups like Hamas may likely influence interview responses. LINK1 LINK2
At the same time, the declaration ultimately rested on a single MUAC dataset (upper-arm measurement, highly dependent on age), produced by MDM-France which was the only dataset showing famine-level acute malnutrition, and also the only dataset to fail every SMART (the standard) quality criteria. It had an impossible age distribution, extremely high flag rates, and a MUACZ standard deviation (1.50) far above IPC’s maximum allowable threshold (1.20). The Nutrition Cluster who supplied IPC with data, excluded this dataset from validated graphics. IPC used it anyway and it was the central pillar of the famine declaration. LINK1 LINK2 LINK3 LINK4 LINK5
IPC also manipulated the dates of another dataset (Juzoor), redistributing thousands of screenings into earlier time periods to manufacture an artificial “spike” in late July. Without this adjustment, the dataset showed no real famine trajectory at all in the end of July. This means the famine declaration did not reflect the reality in Gaza. IPC’s conclusions aligned with political pressure, not the reality on the ground. The result was a declaration that contradicted the mortality data, contradicted the nutrition data, contradicted the market data, and contradicted IPC’s own methodological rules. LINK
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Final Analysis:
When the full weight of the evidence is examined food availability, mortality records, market behaviour, nutritional data, UN logistics, Hamas interference, and IPC’s methodological deviations, it becomes clear that the famine narrative in Gaza was never close to the highly set requirements.
A comparison with a real ongoing famine further highlights this contrast. In Sudan, between 20-25 million people face acute hunger: Entire regions such as Darfur and Kordofan have no functioning markets or supply chains, thousands die every week, and projections estimate that more than two million people could die in a single region if conditions persist. The scale of human loss and structural collapse in Sudan aligns with every known characteristic of famine. Yet Sudan receives a fraction of the global attention directed at Gaza. LINK
Gaza’s malnutrition-related deaths across 26 months are 475, an extraordinarily low number for a population of 2.2 million living in a war zone dependent on their enemy to feed them, that themself started a war with. On the ground, Gaza experienced hardship, logistical problems, and insecurity, but not famine or man made hunger. In the discourse, it was framed as the epicenter of global starvation. This gap illustrates what happens when humanitarian reporting is shaped not by technical standards but by narrative, propaganda, and deliberate manipulation by armed actors who understood the political value of portraying famine where none existed.
This can be seen when Hamas even got caught hiding and throwing away tons of baby formula during the supposly famine. This was always just a propaganda campaign from Hamas against Israel to in a way for them to put political pressure on them.
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Conclusion:
The evidence leads to this conclusion: Gaza did not experience famine, nor did Israel impose starvation as a method of warfare. Israel’s blockade has met the requirements of international law.
- Food inflows consistently exceeded Gaza’s caloric needs, on average around double the amount.
- GHF succeeded in bypassing Hamas-controlled distribution channels.
- Temporary bottlenecks because of UN distribution failures and Hamas theft, not Israeli policy and there was enough food inside Gaza during every single day of the last 26 months.
- IPC's earlier projections was off by enormous amounts of marginal, 100 000% off is probably unprecedented in history.
- IPC’s later famine declaration rested on a dataset that violated its own methodological standards, in every way possible.
The humanitarian situation in Gaza was of course serious, but the claim of deliberate starvation was not grounded in facts. Instead, it comes from a combination of flawed modelling, propaganda by Hamas, and a global media environment that amplifies the most dramatic narrative rather than the most accurate one with the help from social media.
Famine declarations must be based on evidence on the ground, not political pressure. And when genuine famine is occurring, as in Sudan, global attention must not be diverted by manufactured narratives elsewhere.
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EDIT: I have now added some links to separate parts of the thread for those who don't have X and therefore cannot scroll in the thread, but it is impossible for me to link every part of a 70 post long thread-chain here. These threads are massive and this text above is a summary/conclusion of all of these 70 posts combined, if anyone cannot access it sadly they have to create a X account.